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a b s t r a c t
Overfishing and degradation of the marine environment continue to plague coastal com-
munitiesworldwide, withmultiple diverse solutions being proposed. Territorial Use Rights
for Fisheries (TURFs) is a fishery management approach that aligns fishers’ incentives
with sustainability, while marine reserves have proven effective for ecosystem protection,
and in some cases for fishery enhancement. These two management approaches are of-
ten used in isolation, leaving the potential utility of integrating them poorly understood.
We examine cases where TURFs and marine reserves have been implemented together to
create ‘‘TURF-reserves’’. We compiled a database of 27 TURF-reserves and collected in-
formation on the governance, management, enforcement, fishing practices, fishing rights,
regulations, and design attributes for each site. We address several research questions in-
cluding: what species are managed with TURF-reserves, how are TURF-reserves created
and who is involved in the process? Our findings show that the majority of surveyed
TURF-reserves arose from previously established TURF systems that target a range of fish-
eries, andmultiple entities play a role in TURF-reserve development andmanagement. We
also examine the differences between two TURF-reserve archetypes and find that those
developed with a strong history of customary tenure share distinct qualities from those
created in a more recently established, government-mandated system.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Small-scale coastal fisheries are central to local economies, poverty alleviation, and food security for millions around
the world (Béné, 2006; FAO, 2005). Many of these fisheries are severely threatened by chronic overfishing (Andrew et al.,
2007; Costello et al., 2012; Jackson et al., 2001), destructive fishing practices (Cinner, 2009; McClanahan et al., 2009),
environmental degradation (Lotze et al., 2006; Pandolfi et al., 2003; Waycott et al., 2009), and interactions with large-scale
commercial fisheries (Salas et al., 2007), all of which can have negative impacts on community livelihoods, food security,
and marine ecosystem health. As these threats persist, demand for local marine resources continues to increase as coastal
populations grow. These combined pressures call for integrated approaches to management that aim to ensure future
sustainability of small-scale fisheries while benefiting resource users and protecting their marine environment.
The implementation of property rights as a fisheries management approach has gained more attention in recent years
as a way to address the negative consequences of open access fishing. Property rights give fishers ownership over marine
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resources, thereby providing an incentive tomanage for long-term sustainability. Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs)
are a spatial form of property rights in which individuals or a collective group of fishers are granted exclusive access to
harvest resources within a geographically defined area (Christy, 1982). Harvest rights in TURFs can range from privileges
to fish in areas that are leased from the government to complete ownership over the delineated TURF area. TURFs have
existed for centuries in some small-scale fishing communities, often in the form of customary marine tenure, as is common
in traditional fishing communities in the Pacific Islands (Johannes, 1978, 2002; Ruddle et al., 1992). Drawing from these
experiences and property rights theory, TURFs have been growing in popularity as a means to support sustainable fisheries,
often in locations where there has been significant depletion of local marine resources (Cancino et al., 2007). The ability
to control access to resources through TURFs benefits the welfare of local communities by increasing fishery sustainability
as well-designed TURFs eliminate the race to fish (Cancino et al., 2007). Furthermore, the long-term ownership rights may
incentivize fishers to conserve the resource and the local marine ecosystem by implementing management measures such
as marine reserves within or adjacent to the TURF.
Studies have shown that marine reserves can lead to increases in fish biomass, diversity, and abundance (Lester et al.,
2009); enhance resilience to the impacts of climate change and natural disturbances (Carilli et al., 2009; Micheli et al.,
2012; Mumby and Harborne, 2010); conserve biodiversity and critical habitats (Halpern, 2003; Russ and Alcala, 2011); and
provide alternative income through tourism (Arin and Kramer, 2002; McCook et al., 2010). Given these benefits, there are
clear advantages to placing marine reserves alongside TURFs as many coastal communities have much to gain in terms of
additional sources of income (Sala et al., 2013) and climate change adaptation (Badjeck et al., 2010; Micheli et al., 2012).
Furthermore, marine reserves’ potential role as a fisheries management tool (Gaines et al., 2010b) suggests another possible
rationale for implementing reserves alongside TURFs. Studies have shown that reserves can enhance local fisheries through
larval dispersal and adult spillover of targeted species that are protected within reserve boundaries (Halpern et al., 2009;
Harrison et al., 2012; Pelc et al., 2010).While the added benefits to fisheries through spillover are well documented for some
fisheries, without exclusive ownership over the resource surplus, fishers are not able to realize the full economic benefits
of a locally implemented marine reserve. Furthermore, insufficient enforcement and compliance may limit marine reserve
effectiveness (Mora et al., 2006). Therefore, the use of marine reserves as a means to improve fisheries sustainability for
small-scale fisheries may be limited without application of additional management actions such as exclusive fishing rights
through TURFs. Of course, it is also important to note that targeted species, even those that are benthic and sedentary, can
have varying spatial scales of larval dispersal from a fewmeters to hundreds of kilometers (Shanks, 2009). Local larval export
fromnearbymarine reserves could benefit TURF fishers, as foundbyAlmany et al. (2013) in PapuaNewGuinea tenured areas,
but larger dispersal distances of targeted species could prevent TURF fishers from fully capturing some of the added benefit
of a marine reserve.
There is a growing recognition of the potential benefits of combining TURFs with marine reserves to create
‘‘TURF-reserves’’ (Costello and Kaffine, 2010; Gaines et al., 2010a; Poon and Bonzon, 2013). For the purposes of this study,
we define a TURF-reserve1 as a marine conservation and fisheries management approach that combines (1) allocation of
harvest rights to a defined group of fishers in a designated area (TURF) with the ability to limit access, and (2) a clearly
defined marine reserve located within or adjacent to the TURF. The reserve(s) can take many forms and may be permanent,
temporary or seasonal, and prohibit take of some or all species within the reserve boundaries.
While various forms of TURF-reserves have been implemented around the world, a systematic evaluation of TURF-
reserves as a combined marine conservation and fisheries management approach does not exist. This initial effort aims
to compile and synthesize existing information on TURF-reserves and provide a preliminary analysis of TURF-reserve
characteristics in order to better understand the environments and conditions in which they arise. We conducted a
comprehensive review of the scientific and gray literatures to develop a global database of TURF-reserves, including
information on governance, enforcement, monitoring, fishing practices, fishing rights, regulations, and site design.
By compiling this dataset of TURF-reserves and their key attributes, we are able to examine the overall trends and
characteristics of these sites, such as location, size, gear types, and methods of enforcement, while also addressing some
important research questions about these systems. First, we assessed whether the TURF and marine reserve are typically
created simultaneously, or whether it is more common for one component to precede the other.
Second, to better understand the resource characteristics of TURF-reserves, we examined the types of species most
commonlymanaged by TURF-reserves. Specieswith limitedmobility, such as benthic or sedentary species, may bemanaged
more effectively through TURFs than more mobile species because it is more likely that their home range lies within the
delineated TURF. Mobile species, such as pelagic finfish, that travel outside of defined TURF boundaries may be subject to
threats beyond the control of TURF managers and fishers, posing a challenge to successful TURF management. Additionally,
species with an early age of maturity may lend themselves to more successful TURF-reserve adoption. Fast growing species
allow local fishers to see the benefits of a TURF-reserve more quickly, keeping local communities willing to continue
managing the TURF-reserve. Therefore, we hypothesize that TURF-reserves will tend to focus on managing species with
more limited movement potential and higher growth rates.
Third, we examined the role different institutions play in the establishment of TURF-reserves. External influencers, such
as conservation non-governmental organizations (NGOs), may be an essential part of the TURF-reserve process by taking
1 It is important to acknowledge that there are varied definitions and understandings of TURFs. Our definition is rather inclusive, and some of the TURFs
presented here may not meet stricter definitions.
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Table 1
Descriptions of TURF-reserve database categories.
Database category Description
Governance Process by which the TURF-reserve is managed at the local and national scale by specific individuals and/or groups
Enforcement Process by which the TURF-reserve is enforced by specific individuals and/or groups
Site characteristics TURF-reserve design elements including size and location
Fishing practices The species targeted and fishing gears utilized by TURF fishers
Fishing rights Allocation, terms, and conditions of TURF fishing rights such as lease length and distribution of fishing quota
Regulations Regulations pertaining to the TURF-reserve
Monitoring Biological monitoring practices within the TURF-reserve
an active role in gaining support and building capacity for implementation and management. Of particular interest are
cases where TURF-reserves have either developed naturally out of the local community or were driven strongly by external
influence from outside groups. Examining these two scenarios can provide insight into how and why TURF-reserves are
created.
Finally, we explore the idea that a distinction can be made between TURF-reserves that have been established in regions
with a long history of local, community-based marine tenure practices, and those that have been more recently adopted
by national government’s as an alternative fisheries management strategy. Based on this observation, we developed a TURF
system typology andmade comparisons across sites to better understand how TURF-reserve design may be reflective of the
host nation’s fisheries management history and legislative framework.
2. Methods
2.1. Data collection
TURF-reserve case study sites were selected through an extensive review of peer-reviewed and gray literature, technical
reports, conference proceedings, book chapters, and legislative documents in both English and Spanish. The search engines
Google, Google Scholar, and Web of Science were used to search for relevant literature using the following search terms:
territorial use rights for fisheries, exclusive fishing rights, fisheries management, co-governance, community-based marine
resource management, marine tenure, marine reserves, no-take zones, and marine protected areas. There were a large number
of potential case studies identified through the literature review, but only those sites that met our TURF-reserve definition
were included in our database. This determination often relied upon clear evidence of recognized territorial rights over
marine resources at the site. Once a TURF-reserve was selected for inclusion and the information available from literature
exhausted, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key persons involved with the TURF-reserve in order to fill
information gaps. These expertswere often the authors of journal articles or reports that directly discussed the TURF-reserve,
and included academics, non-governmental organization members, and Peace Corps volunteers with TURF-reserve field
experience. Questions asked to each individual were driven by gaps in our database for each case study. After reaching out
to personal contacts and key experts, we sought referrals to additional people that could provide information. All of the
literature and personal contacts for each TURF-reserve case study can be found in the Supplemental Information (Table A1
in Appendix A).
Over 60 individual characteristics of TURF-reserve systems are included in the database. Sevenbroad categories are repre-
sented: governance, enforcement,monitoring, fishing practices, fishing rights, regulations, and site design (Table 1). For each
case study, we compiled data on as many characteristics as possible, but there were significant information gaps. Detailed
descriptions of each database category can be found in Table A2 in Appendix A.
Governance data for each case study were collected to describe the people and processes key to TURF-reserve manage-
ment. Information on TURF-reserve governance focused on legislation, management bodies, and the allocation of rights.
Distinctions were made between the individuals or groups that are granted TURF access rights by the government, and how
individual fishers are allowed to participate in the TURF fishery. If information was available, the manner of enforcement
was recorded. We also collected data regarding existing regulations for each TURF (e.g., quotas, size limits, gear restrictions,
effort limits, etc.) and the associated reserve (e.g., species restrictions, duration of closure, etc.).
To better understand the site characteristics of each TURF-reserve, we collected data on the targeted species managed
within the TURF, fishing gear used, size and location of both the TURF and reserve, and how much of the fishing grounds
are set aside as a marine reserve. We collected information on monitoring practices and their findings, but this information
was sparse and unsuitable for inclusion in our reported results.
Data were collected on the presence of groups or individuals involved in the creation, implementation, andmanagement
of each TURF-reserve. In many cases the literature relevant to each TURF-reserve detailed the history of its creation and
indicatedwhowas involved from the beginning and/or who became involved later on in the process. Often these were iden-
tified as NGOs, government agencies, universities, or specific researchers or scientists. This information was incorporated
in the database as a binary entry (1 for presence, 0 for absence) for multiple categories including ‘‘Who implemented re-
serve’’ and ‘‘Who chose reserve location’’. Additionally a list of all involved parties was included in the category ‘‘Supporting
groups’’.
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Table 2
Assignment of TURF archetype categories to each country based upon the national legislation
and history of TURFs as a form of fisheries management.
Country TURF archetype
Fiji 1
Samoa 1
Vanuatu 1
Belize 2
Brazil 2
Chile 2
Japan 2
Mexico 2
Philippines 2
Spain 2
Definitions: Archetype 1—systems that have evolved from a history of customary marine
tenure andhave been formally recognized throughnational legislation. Archetype 2—systems
where the government has developed a framework to implement TURFs to replace previously
open access systems while still considering community-level ties to the local resources.
2.2. Data analysis
Much of the data collected were used to identify common characteristics in TURF-reserves worldwide. Data at the
individual TURF-reserve level were summarized across all sites for the following variables: species targeted, fishing gears
used, regulations implemented, area (km2), type of reserves implemented (permanent, temporary or seasonal), andmethod
of enforcement. In addition, comparisonsweremade across all ten countries in the database onhowTURF rights are allocated
and fishing privileges assigned. This categorical information came fromnational legislative policies aswell as how individual
TURF-reserves have established fishing privileges.
In order to compare the different conditions underwhich a TURF-reserve is created,wedeveloped a typology based on the
construct of the host nation’s TURF system. These two archetypes are defined as follows: Archetype 1 systems have evolved
from a history of inherited rights through customary marine tenure and have been formally recognized through national
legislation, while in Archetype 2 systems, the government has distributed rights to implement TURFs to replace previously
open access systems while still considering community-level ties to the local resources. Table 2 lists the countries included
in this study and how they are categorized according to these two archetypes. Exploratory analyses using these archetypes
were conducted to identify significant differences between the two classes of TURF systems and design of their associated
TURF-reserves.
Themajor limitation to our analysis was the availability of data on the performance of TURF-reserves in terms of biomass
production, fishery yields, economic gains, or conservation objectives. The lack of this information prevented us from being
able to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of TURF-reserves on the whole and different TURF-reserve components.
3. Results
3.1. Site characteristics
The database consists of 27 TURF-reserves from ten countries that span the globe (Fig. 1). Species targeted by TURF-
reserve fishers are very diverse with molluscs being the most commonly caught taxon followed by finfish and crustaceans
(Fig. 2(A)). TURF-reserves are used tomanage either a single species as in Japan, a group of species, such asMexico and Chile’s
benthic resources, or all species that lie within the geographically defined TURF boundaries. The majority of surveyed cases
fall into the last category, but this result is in part due to the high number of TURF-reserve case studies from Vanuatu, nine
in total, where TURFs are typically allocated for all species. Eighteen of the surveyed TURF-reserves have rights to all marine
species within the TURF area, while five allocate TURF rights solely for benthic resources and the four TURF-reserves found
in Japan are for individual pelagic and benthic species. TURF-reserves in the Pacific Islands, including Fiji and Vanuatu, take
on a more traditional form and typically encompass all resources within their geographic boundaries, while TURF-reserves
createdmore recently tend to focus on individual species or groups of species. A TURF-reserve inNavidad, Chile is an example
of the latter; Chilean TURFs are allocated to local fisher unions for their exclusive harvest of all benthic resources, but not
finfish. TURF systems that allocate exclusive user rights over specific species or types of species (e.g., benthic resources) are
also found in Mexico and Japan.
TURF-reserve species are targeted with a variety of gears that range in selectivity from beach gleaning to trawling, with
diving and hook and line as the most commonly utilized gears (Fig. 2(B); Table A3 in Appendix A). These low-intensity gears
are common in TURFs for artisanal fisheries, while the higher cost, higher intensity gears such as trawls and dredge nets
were only found in Japanese and Brazilian TURF-reserves.
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Fig. 1. Map of surveyed TURF-reserves. Points (•) indicate locations of single TURF-reserve sites while squares () indicate multiple TURF-reserve sites.
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Fig. 2. Summary of fishery level data. (A) The type of species targeted by TURF-reserve fishers and their distribution among TURFs that manage single
species, multiple taxa and all species, and, (B) the gear types used for fishing (Table A3 in Appendix A). Total frequency is greater than 27 (the number of
sites) because many TURF-reserve fisheries target more than one type of species and use multiple gears.
Fig. 3. Total area of individual TURF-reserve sites included in the database (in square kilometers).
The size of TURF-reserve systems across all sites ranges from 0.5 km2 inWorasifiu, Vanuatu to 1738 km2 in Ise Bay, Japan
(Fig. 3). There is no information on the total TURF area for nine of the case studies but when information was available, the
area set aside as a reserve was collected and compared to the size of the available TURF fishing grounds. The majority
of marine reserves cover 5% or less of the total TURF fishing ground (Fig. 4), with no significant correlation between the
total size of the TURF-reserve systems and the size of their associated marine reserves (Pearson’s correlation; r = 0.33,
p = 0.19).
3.2. Allocation of TURFs
Data on rights allocation for TURF-reserves (recorded at the country level) were used to identify which groups receive
TURFs and how individuals are able to participate in TURF fisheries (Table 3). While the initial allocation of TURFs was given
to either a community as a whole, or to a group of organized fishers, the requirements to participate in the TURF fishery
102 J.C. Afflerbach et al. / Global Ecology and Conservation 2 (2014) 97–106
Fig. 4. The number of TURF-reserves that have set aside the specified amount of TURF fishing ground (horizontal axis) as a marine reserve. Shading
indicates the various forms of marine reserves within each category. A permanent reserve is never opened to fishing, while a seasonal reserve may be
implemented only during the fishing season and a temporary reserve is periodically opened for fishing. We include cases where multiple types of marine
reserves are found within a single TURF-reserve.
Table 3
Allocation of TURFs. Fishing rights describes the entity that receives TURF rights. The privilege for individual fishers to participate in the TURF fishery is
defined by either one or a combination of the following: being a resident of the community; being licensed, permitted or registered to fish; or being a fishing
organization member. Once an entity obtains rights, individual fishers may need to fulfill one or more requirements to gain the privilege to participate in
the TURF managed fishery.
Fishing rights Privilege to fish
Organized
fishers
Individual
fishers
Communities Community
residency
License, permit or
registry
Fishing organization
membership
Fiji ✓ ✓ ✓
Japan ✓ ✓ ✓
Mexico ✓ ✓
Chile ✓ ✓
Philippines ✓ ✓ ✓
Brazil ✓ ✓
Belize ✓ ✓
Vanuatu ✓ ✓
Samoa ✓ ✓
Spain ✓ ✓ ✓
varied and included community residency, purchased licenses, permits or another form of registration, and membership
with a fishing organization.
3.3. TURF-reserve management
There was considerable variation in the types of marine reserves set up within TURF boundaries with the majority of
reserves created as permanent, no-take marine reserves, but some established as seasonal, species-specific or temporary
marine reserves (Fig. 4). For all but one TURF-reserve, the marine reserves lie within the TURF boundaries.
In 18 of the 27 surveyed TURF-reserves, the TURF system was established before a marine reserve was implemented
(Fig. 5). In some cases, such as Lira, Spain, and Safata and Aleipata Marine Protected Areas in Samoa, both the TURF and
associated marine reserves were established together. In both the Philippines and Belize sites, TURFs were introduced after
a marine reserve had already been implemented. A wide variety of fishing regulations are being utilized across current
TURF-reserve systems with the most common being size limits, gear restrictions, and species bans (Table 4). Enforcement
of both the TURF and reserve is often a shared responsibility between local fishers, deputized wardens, and government
officials (Fig. 6).
3.4. TURF-reserve archetypes
The two TURF-reserve archetypes showed some significant differences across multiple variables (Table 5). Archetype 1
TURF-reserves, found in Fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu, are characterized by lower Human Development Indices (HDI), smaller
TURF-reserves in terms of area managed, but a higher percent of the area closed to fishing when compared to Archetype 2
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Table 4
Established fishing regulations specific to each TURF-reserve. ✓ = TURF-reserve applies restriction, X = the TURF-reserve does not apply restriction,
–= no data. Definitions for each of the fishing regulations can be found in Table A4 in Appendix A.
TURF-reserve Country TURF fishing regulations
TAC Size limits Daily catch limit Gear restrictions Seasonal limits Species bans
Glover’s Reef Belize X ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓
Port Honduras Belize X ✓ X ✓ ✓ –
Corumbau Brazil X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ –
Navidad Chile ✓ ✓ X X ✓ X
Kubulau Fiji – ✓ – ✓ – ✓
Navakavu Fiji X – – ✓ – –
Ise Bay Japan X – – – ✓ –
Mutsu Bay Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ –
Nishi Japan ✓ ✓ – ✓ ✓ –
Rausu Japan ✓ – – ✓ – –
Isla Natividad Mexico ✓ ✓ X – ✓ ✓
Candelaria Philippines – – – ✓ – –
Mahaba Island Philippines – – – ✓ – –
Romblon Philippines X X – ✓ – –
Concepcion Philippines – – – ✓ – –
Aleipata Samoa X – X ✓ – –
Safata Samoa X – X ✓ – –
Lira Spain ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ – –
Eratap Vanuatu – ✓ – – – ✓
Laonamoa Vanuatu – ✓ – – – ✓
Managliliu Vanuatu – ✓ – ✓ – ✓
Piliura Vanuatu – ✓ – – – –
Siviri Vanuatu – ✓ – ✓ – ✓
Takara Vanuatu – ✓ – ✓ – ✓
Tanoliu Vanuatu – ✓ – ✓ – ✓
Unakap Vanuatu – – – – – ✓
Worasifiu Vanuatu – – – – – ✓
Marine reserve
TURF
Simultaneous
Unknown
Fig. 5. Proportion of TURF-reserves for which the TURF was
implemented first, the marine reserve was implemented
first, or the two components were created simultaneously.
Fishers Organization
Warden
Government Official
Warden & Government Official
Fishers Org.  & Government
No Enforcement
Fig. 6. Proportion of TURF-reserves that utilize various forms of enforcement
for exclusive access, fishing regulations and/or marine reserves. Enforcement
may be the responsibility of a fishing organization, local non-governmental
warden, or a government official.
TURF-reserves. Archetype 1 TURF-reserves manage all species found within the site, while the number of species managed
in Archetype 2 sites range from just one to all targeted species. Additionally, the majority of Archetype 1 sites had only
one marine reserve associated with the TURF, while the majority of Archetype 2 sites had more than one reserve. For both
archetypes, the majority had a TURF established before a reserve, but five of the 13 Archetype 2 sites had a reserve set
up prior to the TURF. Lastly, fishing rights are allocated to entire communities in Archetype 1 TURF-reserves while most
Archetype 2 sites allocate rights to organized fishers.
By examining the processes throughwhich TURF-reserves are created, implemented, andmanaged, we are able to reveal
a key factor that may be driving TURF-reserve implementation. A common trend we found across all sites was the diver-
sity of stakeholders involved in either the creation and/or management of the system. Each TURF-reserve had at least two
key players involved in the initial proposal, development, or management (Table A5 in Appendix A). In most cases an NGO,
governmental unit, and/or community or fishers organization worked together to create either one or both aspects of the
TURF-reserve. In certain cases such as Lira, Spain and Nishi, Japan, a local, well-respected scientist was also critical in gaining
community support for the TURF-reserve. Thirteen of the 27 TURF-reserve case studies included in the database had at least
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Table 5
Comparison of Archetypes 1 and 2 across the listed TURF-reserve characteristics. Statistical tests performed to calculate significance are listed, along with
resulting p-values.
TURF-reserve characteristics Archetype 1 Archetype 2 p-value Statistical test
Means across all sites
HDI 0.65 0.78 0.000096∗ Wilcoxon signed rank sum
TURF size (km2) 33.3 523.74 0.003∗ Wilcoxon signed rank sum
Reserve size (km2) 9.86 12.63 0.019∗ Wilcoxon signed rank sum
Proportion of site closed to fishing 13.9% 7.5% 0.22 t-test
Percentage of TURF-reserve sites that have the following characteristics
Number of marine reserves associated with the TURF 0.057 Fisher’s exact
Single reserve 33.3% 14.8%
Multiple reserves 14.8% 37%
Species managed by TURF 0.0016∗ Fisher’s exact
All species within the TURF 50% 19%
Multiple species (>1,<all) 0% 15.4%
A single species 0% 15.4%
TURF-reserve creation 0.057 Fisher’s exact
TURF created first 42.3% 26.9%
Reserve created first 0% 19.2%
Created simultaneously 7.7% 3.8%
Fishing rights allocation 0.0002∗ Fisher’s exact
Organized fishers 0% 29.6%
Individual fishers 0% 7.4%
Communities 48.1% 14.8%
* Significance<0.05.
one external scientist or NGO involved in any or all steps of the TURF-reserve process, and 17 of the case studies involved
at least two separate interests from outside of the community.
4. Discussion
This survey of global TURF-reserves provides insight into the diverse environmentswhere this approach to fisheriesman-
agement and marine conservation has been implemented. The heterogeneity of the case studies surveyed suggests the po-
tential applicability of this approach tomultiple socioeconomic and ecological environments, as long as they are established
according to national legislation and customary norms. By examining the governance and management structures of these
case studies, we begin to understand the unique characteristics that play a role in TURF-reserve development.
We examined whether TURFs and marine reserves were set up sequentially or simultaneously, which was motivated
by the idea that a TURF-reserve may be created if a TURF or a marine reserve operating in isolation is underperforming.
We found that the majority (85%) of sites implemented the TURF and reserve components sequentially with 66% of all sites
establishing a TURF first. One potential explanation for the trend is that once a community obtains rights over a single species
or group of targeted resources, they have an increased incentive to sustainably manage those marine resources and engage
in conservation actions such as creating a marine reserve. This is consistent with the findings of Ovando et al. (2013) that
fishing cooperatives often create private marine protected areas, especially when operating under a national TURF system.
Sites that have implemented a reserve first (19%) might be explained by the legislative environment in which TURFs and
reserves are established. For example, Glover’s Reef and Port Honduras sites in Belize had established marine reserves for
over ten years before an associated TURF fishery was created. This more recent development is due to a combined effort
between environmental NGOs and the Belizean government to establish a national TURF system (Foley, 2012). With limited
information on how these sites performed before and after implementation, these results can only be viewed as an indication
of how TURF-reserves are implemented, whichmight be due to the enabling legislation as well as the compounding benefits
fishers realize when TURFs and reserves are implemented sequentially rather than simultaneously.
The surveyed TURF-reserves vary widely in design, ranging from single-species TURFs with seasonal marine reserves
prohibiting take of a single-species, as seen in Japan, to TURFsmanaging all coastal specieswith permanent no-take reserves,
as exemplified by the Philippines sites. The majority of surveyed TURF-reserves are characterized by fishers using low-tech
gears, such as diving and hook and line, to selectively target a very diverse group of marine resources. With no clear pattern
for specific groups of species managed under TURF-reserves, we did not find support for our initial hypothesis that fast
growing and low mobility species would be preferred for TURF-reserve adoption and management.
A comparison of two TURF-reserve archetypes highlights some common differences found between historical TURF
systems (Archetype 1) and those created within a newer, government-mandated construct (Archetype 2). The most distinct
characteristics of Archetype 1 TURF-reserves, found in Fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu, are their smaller sizes, management of all
species foundwithin TURF boundaries, and allocation of harvest privileges to the local community. These characteristics are
linked to their long history of customary marine tenure (CMT) where nearshore marine areas are viewed as an extension
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of the land boundaries (Ruddle et al., 1992; Pulea, 1993). Fisheries management is not the sole focus of CMT systems,
which exist to manage ownership over land and sea territories and access to resources as well as organization of activities
and political groups (Hviding and Ruddle, 1991; Ruddle et al., 1992). Rather than focusing on specific species, people or
designated fishing areas, CMT has a broader focus on the whole marine ecosystem and its cultural and socioeconomic
significance to the local community or clan that holds ownership (Hviding and Ruddle, 1991). Implemented regulations
in these TURF-reserve sites are aligned with traditional practices such as temporary spatial closures, and gear or species
bans in order to ensure stock sustainability for the local community into the future (Ruddle et al., 1992; Cinner and Aswani,
2007). The sites that fall in Archetype 2 are more strictly managed in terms of who has access to the resources and what
species will or will not be managed. Additionally, Archetype 2 TURF-reserves may be created in areas where commercially
important species are the management focus and both the TURF and reserve components are designed to best manage
specific species. In contrast Archetype 1 TURF-reserves may not be driven by the value of local fish stocks since species are
often harvested for subsistence and local consumption.
Without any indicators of success, it is not possible to conclude whether a TURF-reserve set up in one construct versus
the other is more likely to meet their objectives. Instead, this comparison provides insight into what a TURF-reserve might
look like if being established in a country that falls either within an Archetype 1 or 2 system.
Our results also provide some information on what types of actors are often involved in TURF-reserve creation and/or
management. The TURF-reserve systems found in the Pacific Island region, and common toArchetype 1, represent a return to
the more traditional, customary marine management approach of the region (Johannes, 2002). While historically, exclusive
access and permanent and temporary no-take areaswere the norm inmany Pacific Islands, their recent resurgence can often
be attributed in-part to the increased interest by outside groups. For all surveyed sites in Fiji, Vanuatu, and Samoa, outside
government agencies, academics, and/or environmental NGOs were involved in some aspect of the process. TURF-reserves
established in Samoa are a result of government efforts to decentralize fisheriesmanagement and support community based
fisheries management. Both TURF-reserves surveyed in Fiji are heavily supported by environmental NGOs who provide
technical guidance to local communities. These findings support the claim by Johannes (2002) that the recent rise in
customary practices is in large part due to multiple factors, which include an increased involvement from NGOs and local
governments.
The involvement of multiple external groups is not unique to the tropical Pacific TURF-reserves. In regions such as Japan
and Chile where there are large TURF systems, local scientists or academics often guided the move towards coupled TURF-
reserves. NGOs were involved in TURF-reserve establishment for nearly every site in Mexico, Philippines, Spain, Brazil,
and Belize. These efforts to establish or re-establish TURF-reserves almost always resulted from interactions with NGOs
and scientists rather than transpiring directly from the community. While the interaction between communities, NGOs
and scientists in forming TURF-reserves is apparent from this database, further study is needed to identify the underlying
incentives for their creation.
It is important to acknowledge the potential biases in the methodology used in this study. While an extensive literature
review and discussion with experts around the globe yielded a tremendous amount of information, there are likely addi-
tional TURF-reserves that exist but were not included in this study due to their lack of published information. As indicated
by our review, TURF-reserves have been established in data poor environments, for which published and easily accessible
information is sparse. Additionally, the presence of an NGO or external funding source may be a reason for published infor-
mation on a TURF-reserve site and therefore inherently biases our database to select those sites that have vested interest
by a university, NGO, or other external party. Lastly, only English or Spanish literature was included in the search process,
thereby limiting the pool of information to those described in either of these languages.
While this study provides a comprehensive look at characteristics of current TURF-reserves, it is limited in its ability to
measure TURF-reserve success and identify contributing factors. The database does not include key performance indicators
such as biological and fisheries outcomes, TURF-reserve financing, feasibility and success of enforcement, and adaptations
in management. This information was less readily available and therefore could not be included in this analysis. We rec-
ommend further investigation into these critical TURF-reserve components through new data collection efforts in order to
accurately measure TURF-reserve performance. As more information becomes available on the social, biological, and eco-
nomic characteristics of successful TURF-reserves, more detailed analysis can help inform local and international efforts to
implement TURF-reserves in order to better meet conservation and fisheries objectives.
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